CyberScan Browser Tools — user help
The toolkit reviews information you supply in your browser. Choose a tool, read its supported inputs, wait for Ready, then paste text or choose the files you want examined. Tools accepting supplied evidence have a synthetic example you can try before using your own material. The browser diagnostic observes the actual current page. Select Analyse to run the check; inspect its scope, coverage, findings and limitations before acting on the result.
This is a collection of local evidence checks. It does not scan an arbitrary website, certify a device, provide antivirus clearance or establish that an account is secure. A domain name alone does not supply DNS answers, a live certificate or a website export.
What happens to your input
The page and its fixed application assets are delivered by the website. After those assets are ready, the analysis engines use the supplied content locally and do not request the links, domains, keys or endpoints found in it. Tool pages have no analytics, tag managers or remote analysis services in their application document. Hosting still sees ordinary requests needed to deliver that document and its assets.
Inputs and results stay in application memory by default. Clear/reset drops the application's references, clears the form and terminates the analysis worker. It cannot promise forensic memory erasure or delete a report you already saved. A browser diagnostic can create and immediately remove disposable storage test values; it does not read your existing stored values.
Do not supply account login credentials, API secrets or private signing keys. The password tool is for a candidate you are considering, not an account-login test. Public-key verification requires a public key you independently trust. Pattern-based redaction is best-effort: review a report before sharing it, especially if public-looking certificate names, hostnames or business identifiers are sensitive to you.
Imported HTML, SVG, emails, scripts and configuration are data. They are not shown as executable previews. Suspicious destinations appear as text. The toolkit does not install packages, open submitted links, replay network captures or execute attachments.
Choose the right evidence mode
| Mode | Meaning | What it does not establish |
|---|---|---|
| Current page | Observations available to the CyberScan document and its browser context | Other sites' settings, all browser data or whole-device protection |
| Supplied evidence | A pasted record, selected file or declared snapshot is analysed | Authenticity, completeness, current publication or deployed state unless the relevant evidence actually supplies it |
| Self-reported | Questionnaire answers and supporting notes are your assertions | A verified technical finding, audit certificate or account configuration check |
Tools and supported inputs
| Tool | Supply | Useful result and important boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Browser and page check | No private input | Secure context, required APIs, disposable storage tests, supported permission-status queries and current-page observations. Missing browser support is a compatibility limit. |
| Link and QR check | One URL or PNG/JPEG QR image; optional expected domain | Parsed destination, Unicode/Punycode, credential/subdomain/port/scheme indicators and decoded URL review. No reputation lookup or destination visit. |
| Password candidate | Candidate plus optional related words | Local pattern-based guessing-resistance estimate and a cryptographically random candidate generator. No breach/account-reuse claim; the entered candidate is not exported. |
| File integrity | Selected bytes or text; optional digest, manifest, second file or public signature evidence | SHA-256/384/512, exact equality and reference agreement. A checksum match does not establish the reference's provenance or malware absence. |
| File and metadata | Supported JPEG/PNG, classic PDF, ZIP or ZIP-based Office files | Identifying bytes, misleading names, selected metadata presence, supported active-content and archive-path indicators. Unsupported/encrypted parts remain explicit. |
| Email review | Original .eml or pasted original message text | Supplied sender/routing claims, link destinations, remote references and attachment indicators. Original CRLF .eml bytes and matching supplied public-key evidence are required for supported DKIM verification. |
| Response headers | One response's raw headers; optional comparison | Contextual transport/framing/MIME/referrer/cache/isolation checks and changes. You must supply the response; browser code cannot read arbitrary sites' headers. |
| CSP and CORS | CSP policy/headers plus optional HTML, or a CORS response/request pair | Supported policy parsing, static compatibility and conditional access rules. No live Origin probe or proof of cross-origin data exposure. |
| Cookies | Supplied Set-Cookie headers; stated purpose/host/transport if known | Scope, prefixes, attributes, expiry, partitioning and conflicting scopes. Preference cookies are not automatically treated as authentication cookies. |
| DNS records | Supported BIND-style zone/records; optional previous snapshot | Syntax, alias/conflict/dependency and selected record checks. Missing records remain missing; nothing is resolved externally. |
| Email security policies | SPF/DKIM/DMARC/MTA-STS/TLS-RPT text or zone; optional dependencies; documented DMARC JSON | Local policy validity and conditional calculations. Message authentication, DNS freshness, publication and delivery remain separate. |
| Certificates and public keys | PEM/DER X.509, SPKI, public JWK or supported OpenSSH public key | Identity, SANs, validity, fingerprints, key properties and adjacent signature relationships. No full trusted-path/revocation/live-endpoint verdict. |
| JWT inspection | Compact JWS JWT; optional trusted public JWK/JWKS/SPKI and expectations | Decoding, supported signature verification and claim-policy comparisons as separate stages. Token-controlled key URLs are never followed. |
| Source export | HTML/CSS/JavaScript source; exact supplied resources; optional CSP | Inert resource/form/script/iframe/integrity and static indicator review. JavaScript/CSS lexical checks are not execution or complete program analysis. |
| Sitemap, robots and page review | Sitemap/index XML, robots.txt or HTML; optional URL inventory or mapped selected children | URL/namespace/date/robots matching, static metadata/accessibility indicators and supplied relationships. No indexing, ranking or remote-link-availability claim. |
| HAR review | HAR 1.2 JSON; optional second labelled capture | Observed origins, methods/statuses, redirects, headers, timings and sensitive-looking fields; local comparison. Requests are never replayed. |
| Logs and reports | Text, CSV, JSON/JSONL or supported CSP/DMARC aggregate/TLS-RPT report | Local indicator counts, malformed records, time buckets and general-log comparison. Supplied report claims are not independently authenticated. |
| Configuration review | Selected SSH/Nginx/Apache/Dockerfile/PHP/environment text or JSON/YAML; optional structured baseline | Bounded debug/session/privilege/secret-like and baseline rules. Includes, defaults, overrides and the running deployment are not resolved. |
| Software inventory | package.json, npm lock v1–v3, supported CycloneDX/SPDX JSON; optional previous inventory or advisory snapshot | Declarations, version/source/integrity/hooks and differences. Supported supplied advisories match exact listed npm versions only; absence of a match is not clearance. |
| Guided security review | Answers to 13 controls; optional labelled notes | Prioritised self-reported actions with suggested owners and device-clock target dates. Adapt suggestions to your organisation. |
The interface displays each tool's byte and format limits. The detailed parser ceilings are in parser-limits.md. Input limits include supplementary text and selected files. Password, QR, archive and cryptographic formats have additional bounds. A skipped entry or unsupported format is not a pass.
Understand the results
Read the short conclusion first, then expand the evidence and limitations for the finding you want to understand. Every finding has a stable rule identifier/version, tool version, subject, evidence mode, outcome, explanation and next action. Severity and heuristic confidence are separate from outcome.
| Outcome | How to read it |
|---|---|
| Pass | The named implemented check passed for the evidence actually supplied. Other checks and missing evidence can still be unresolved. |
| Finding | A specific issue or contextual indicator was found. Read the practical action and assumptions. |
| Informational | A useful observation, not a security clearance or failure. |
| Not verified | Necessary evidence, trust or supported semantics are missing. |
| Unsupported | The input format, algorithm or browser capability is outside the declared range. |
| Not applicable | That rule does not apply to this evidence/context. |
| Error | The input could not be processed or a bound was reached. The affected check is incomplete. |
Coverage shows what ran and what remains unresolved. A partial report means some evidence or findings were not processed completely. There is no overall security score or certification badge. A safe-looking brand string, HTTPS URL or absence of a heuristic finding is never proof that a destination is safe.
Workflows requiring supplementary evidence
Compare two captures, zones, inventories or log snapshots
Put the current evidence in the main input and the previous evidence in the supplementary input where offered. Set labels that describe the actual capture, such as “before consent” and “after rejection”. For HAR, these labels describe your captures, not independently verified user-consent states.
General logs can use 5-minute, 15-minute, hourly or daily UTC buckets. The displayed first and last timestamps are observed events, not proven capture boundaries. Two unequal observation windows can have different totals without establishing a rate increase. Dedicated CSP/DMARC/TLS report comparison is outside this release's supported range; each report can be summarised independently.
Supply sitemap-index children without network access
Select the index and child XML files. Choose Index document URL mapping for the supplementary mode. Declare the HTTP(S) URL represented by each document:
{
"documents": [
{"document": 1, "url": "https://example.test/sitemap.xml"},
{"document": 2, "url": "https://example.test/pages.xml"}
]
}
Document numbers follow the input order: pasted text first when present, then the displayed selected-file order. No mapping is inferred from a filename. Missing children, duplicate mappings, nested indexes and cycles remain explicit. The URLs are identifiers in your evidence; the toolkit does not fetch them.
Review DMARC discovery and identifier alignment
Select DMARC DNS snapshot and alignment, set the From domain and any supplied authenticated DKIM/SPF identifiers, and provide the documented local response envelope. Leave supplementary DNS text empty in this mode. This synthetic direct-policy example is deliberately small:
{
"format": "dmarc-dns-v1",
"responses": [
{
"name": "_dmarc.example.test",
"type": "TXT",
"status": "answer",
"complete": true,
"records": ["v=DMARC1; p=reject; psd=n"]
}
]
}
For other questions, supply answer, nodata, nxdomain or error with the corresponding completeness assertion and records. TXT records may be strings or arrays of concatenated TXT segments. TXT, A and AAAA response questions are supported. Omitted answers are unknown, not proof of absence. A discovery/alignment calculation is conditional on these assertions; it does not authenticate the original message, validate DNSSEC or prove fresh publication.
The mode supports bounded RFC 9989 tree walks and direct/organisational/PSD preference, including applicable sp, np and testing semantics. It does not resolve CNAME/DNAME answer chains or duplicate-tag policy recovery. It accepts one supplied DKIM identifier and one SPF identifier per run.
Match an explicitly supplied advisory snapshot
In Software inventory, choose the supplementary Advisory snapshot mode. Use a fixed npm declaration or npm lock inventory. Supply a source, version and snapshot date, then OSV-style records with identifiers, modified dates and explicit affected versions:
{
"source": "https://advisories.example.test/snapshot",
"version": "synthetic-1",
"snapshotDate": "2026-11-01",
"advisories": [
{
"id": "EXAMPLE-2026-1",
"modified": "2026-10-31T10:00:00Z",
"affected": [
{
"package": {"ecosystem": "npm", "name": "example-library"},
"versions": ["1.2.3"]
}
]
}
]
}
This is synthetic data, not a real advisory. The source URL is recorded as supplied provenance and is not opened. Only exact explicitly listed version strings are matched. Version ranges, Git ranges, other ecosystems and unspecified/unpinned declarations remain unverified. A missing match cannot establish that a package is unaffected or current. Check the snapshot's authenticity, completeness and date independently.
Add supporting notes to the questionnaire
Use one labelled note per line, such as restore: Synthetic restore exercise recorded on 2026-10-01. Supported control codes are mfa, access, leavers, passwords, backup, restore, patch, encryption, domain, supplier, payment, incident and continuity. Notes are supplementary self-reported assertions, not verified evidence or binary attachments. Keep secrets and personal details out of them.
Saving and clearing
Download JSON creates a local structured report from the visible result. Print opens the browser's print workflow; available save-as-PDF options depend on your browser and operating system. Neither action automatically attaches your original files. Reports include scope, provenance, rule/tool versions, coverage, limitations and a timestamp from your device's clock.
Passwords, private keys, authentication-cookie values and bearer-token values are excluded from ordinary reports. Other evidence is minimised and redacted on a best-effort basis. Downloading is an explicit persistence action; saved reports are then subject to your normal file-sharing and backup arrangements. No CSV export is offered.
Change the input and rerun to produce a new result. Previous findings are invalidated when inputs change. Cancel stops the worker; clear/reset removes the application's current input/result references. A timed-out, cancelled or malformed analysis does not produce a security pass.
Compatibility and offline limits
Use a supported modern browser over HTTPS. Some algorithms need Web Crypto; QR processing needs worker bitmap/canvas support. Unsupported APIs produce a clear limitation rather than a weaker cryptographic substitute. A page controlled by an unreviewed service worker is blocked from accepting input until the host resolves that scope.
The design requires no analysis network after the page and selected tool's fixed assets are ready. This does not promise first visits, reloads or unopened modules will work offline. At documentation handoff, browser-level physical network-disable testing has not been available; see the actual release verification report for the recorded evidence rather than treating runtime request guards as an offline-switch test.
If a parser rejects your material, check the supported format and size, reduce it to the relevant evidence, and retain originals privately. Do not remove an “unknown” outcome by inventing missing records or keys. Current references, dependency versions, data licences and remaining advanced features are documented in the delivery registers.